Разрыв между правами собственности и контроля, личностью акционера и раскрытием информации компанией на примере России
Аннотация
В литературе, посвященной бухгалтерскому учету и корпоративному управлению, уже долгое время уделяется серьезное внимание влиянию отделения собственности от контроля на раскрытие компанией информации, которое является ключевой характеристикой и основной проблемой управления для публичных компаний. Чтобы более глубоко осветить данную тему, в настоящей статье мы используем уникальный набор панельных данных по котирующимся на бирже компаниям в России, где компании с акциями разных типов появились под воздействием внешних факторов в ходе приватизации. Основным источником данных являются рейтинги прозрачности и раскрытия информации, составленные Standard & Poor’s, дополненные информацией на уровне компании из базы данных «СКРИН». При помощи стандартных методов анализа панельных данных и ряда проверок на устойчивость мы пришли к выводу, что в результате отделения собственности от контроля посредством использования акций разных типов компания раскрывает меньшие объемы информации. Раскрытие информации связано обратной зависимостью с разрывом между правами контроля и собственности крупнейшего акционера (в частности, его объемы растуи вместе с правами собственности, но снижаются вместе с правами контроля). Также существуют свидетельства того, что воздействие разрыва на раскрытие информации зависит от типа держателя контрольного пакета акций. Отрицательное воздействие наиболее ярко выражено, когда держатель контрольного пакета акций является частным лицом из России. При этом оно практически отсутствует в случае иностранных акционеров из неофшорной юрисдикции. В этом отношении государственные и связанные с государством компании, как и иностранные предприятия из офшорной юрисдикции, занимают промежуточную позицию. Данные выводы могут заинтересовать не только ученых, но и регулирующие органы, лиц, профессионально занимающихся инвестициями, и прочих участников фондового рынка.
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