

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN RUSSIAN COMPANIES' ACTIVITIES

Julie Dulyak,

Research Assistant of the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies

Abstract

This study examines the role and the place of the boards of directors in the activity of Russian public and nonpublic companies. The informational base of the paper – 15 in-depth interviews with the members of the boards and specialists in the field of corporate governance conducted in spring-summer 2012.

We compare the views of respondents and try to find something in common in their positions in order to answer the following questions:

- What place the board in the structure of Russian companies governance takes, how much its role has changed and if it complies with theoretical understanding of the boards role;
- What factors of boards' structure define the efficient board.

Nowadays the boards of directors in many Russian companies, regardless if the company is public or not, are working and efficient: settle corporate conflicts and make strategic decisions, companies' capitalization increases as the results of the decisions taken by the boards. The owner is the main driver of the boards' development, the main stakeholder interested in the boards' activity.

JEL: D23, G30, G34, P26.

Key words: Board of directors, corporate governance, institutional environment, Russia.

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